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Abstract
Adversarial decision making is a particular type of decision making problem
where the gain a decision maker obtains as a result of his decisions is affected
by the actions taken by others. Representation of alternatives’ evaluations
and methods to find the optimal alternative are two important aspects in the
adversarial decision making. The aim of this study is to develop a general
framework for solving the adversarial decision making issue under uncertain
environment. By combining fuzzy set theory, game theory and D numbers
theory (DNT), a DNT based game-theoretic framework for adversarial de-
cision making under fuzzy environment is presented. Within the proposed
framework or model, fuzzy set theory is used to model the uncertain evalu-
ations of decision makers to alternatives, the non-exclusiveness among fuzzy
evaluations are taken into consideration by using DNT, and the conflict of
interests among decision makers is considered in a two-person non-constant
sum game theory perspective. An illustrative application is given to demon-
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strate the effectiveness of the proposed model. This work, on one hand, has
developed an effective framework for adversarial decision making under fuzzy
environment; One the other hand, it has further improved the basis of DNT
as a generalization of Dempster-Shafer theory for uncertainty reasoning.
Keywords: Adversarial decision making, D numbers theory,
Dempster-Shafer theory, Fuzzy set theory, Two-person non-constant sum
game, Uncertainty
1. Introduction
In the real world, many scientific and engineering issues can be seen as
or converted to decision making problems. Generally, decision making is
a complicated process that aims to select an alternative which gives deci-
sion makers the highest interests among a variety of options based on the
performances or evaluations of alternatives on various criteria including ben-
efit criteria and cost criteria [1–3]. So far, many technologies and theories
have been developed to help decision makers to achieve the optimal decision
making, for example analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [4, 5], analytic net-
work process (ANP) [6], technique for order preference by similarity to ideal
solution (TOPSIS) [7, 8]. Two important aspects are worthy of particular
concern in almost every decision making process. One is the representation
of evaluations to alternatives, the other is the method to find the optimal
alternative. These two aspects are given special attention in this paper.
Regarding the representation of alternatives’ evaluations or performances,
essentially it is the issue of information modeling, and there have already
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many existing means [9–11]. One of the simplest and most straightforward
ways is using real numbers to express the performances of alternatives, which
is founded on the classical expected utility theory [12, 13] and has the most
solid theoretical basis. But that means is deficient in specially representing
uncertain evaluations, where the uncertainty does not only include random-
ness but also involve vagueness, imprecision, ambiguity, and so on [14, 15].
With the advance of uncertainty reasoning technologies, many theories have
developed to tackle uncertain information and widely used in decision mak-
ing field, such as theory of interval numbers [16], possibility theory [17], soft
set theory [18], rough set theory [19], fuzzy set theory [20, 21], etc. Among
them, fuzzy set theory, aiming to cope with the uncertainty of fuzziness,
has received much attention and is increasingly flourishing since its intuitive
physical meaning and profound philosophical foundation [22–26]. On the
basis of fuzzy set theory, many branches, such as intuitionistic fuzzy set [27]
and hesitant fuzzy set [28], constantly emerge, which provide diverse tools to
express complicated evaluations in decision making. However, when human
beings are involved in the decision making process, overcomplicated data
structures will make it hard to get people’s authentic evaluations about the
alternatives. In balancing the effectiveness and conciseness, fuzzy set theory
is a feasible and preferable solution to model the uncertainty in decision mak-
ing. Therefore, in this paper the decision making under fuzzy environment
is of concern.
With respect to the methods of selecting the best alternative in decision
making, there are much many theories for various type of decision making
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problems such as multi-criteria decision making (MCDM), group decision
making (GDM), and so on. Among these theories of decision making, many
of them consider the situation that the interests of decision makers are basi-
cally consistent, but do not pay enough attention on the conflict of decision
makers’ interests. In many situations the gain a decision maker obtains is
not only dependent on his decisions, but also affected by the actions taken by
other decision makers [29–31]. What’s more important, these decision mak-
ers are conflict of interests. This type of decision making issue is generically
referred to as adversarial decision making [32]. In the adversarial decision
making, the alternatives of decision makers are changed to strategies that
they can choose to achieve their benefits, and a decision maker aims to de-
termine optimal strategy against adversarial opponents. Some researches
have been done for the adversarial decision making. For example, Yager
[33] proposed a knowledge-based approach to adversarial decision making
which mainly studies the use of a decision maker’s expertise, knowledge, and
perceptions, about his adversary to construct a knowledge base about the ac-
tion his believes his adversary will take. In [34], Pelta and Yager presented a
mathematical framework to investigate the balance between inducing confu-
sion and attaining payoff in adversarial decision making. Recent other work,
to name but a few, can be found in references [35–39].
In the most basic form of adversarial decision making, it involves two
competitive participants and each of both sides chooses an strategy without
knowing the choice of the other. In a perspective of game theory, it consti-
tutes a two-person zero sum or non-constant sum game [40]. Therefore, game
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theory is feasibly used in researching the adversarial decision making problem
[29, 30, 41]. Based on two aspects of considerations, the representation of hu-
man being’s uncertain evaluations and methods for decision making, in this
paper we suggest a D numbers theory (DNT) based game-theoretic frame-
work for two persons’ adversarial decision making under fuzzy environment,
where DNT [42, 43] is a new uncertainty reasoning theory which generalizes
Dempster-Shafer theory [44, 45] and already has some applications [46–50].
Within the presented framework, the uncertainty involved in the evaluations
to decision makers’ strategies is expressed by fuzzy linguistic variables, and
the conflict relationship between participants is modelled by a two-person
non-constant sum game. Especially, DNT is used to handle and integrate
the uncertain evaluations, which fully considers the non-exclusiveness among
evaluations expressed fuzzy linguistic variables that is ignored by many pre-
vious studies. An illustrative application is given to show the effectiveness
of the proposed framework.
The contribution of this paper is two folds. At first, we further improve
the basis of DNT by presenting a uniform combination rule for D num-
bers with complete information or incomplete information, and defining the
belief measure and plausibility measure for D numbers, and further clari-
fying the concept of non-exclusiveness in DNT, and providing a new form
for the definition of D numbers. At second, by combining fuzzy set the-
ory, game theory and DNT, we present a new game-theoretic framework for
adversarial decision making under fuzzy environment, where the the non-
exclusiveness among fuzzy evaluations are fully taken into consideration by
exploiting DNT. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives a brief introduction about fuzzy set theory, Dempster-Shafer theory,
and two-person non-constant sum game. In Section 3, the DNT is presented
as a generalization of Dempster-Shafer theory on a set with non-exclusive
elements. Section 4 proposes a DNT based game-theoretic framework for
adversarial decision making under fuzzy environment, and an illustrative
application is given in Section 5 to show the effectiveness of the proposed
framework. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Fuzzy set theory
Fuzzy set theory was first introduced by Zadeh [20] in 1965 to deal with
the uncertainty information. In some real application environments, the
states are subjective concepts which are too complex or too ill-defined to
be reasonably described in conventional quantitative expressions. In those
situation, fuzzy set theory provides an efficiently simple way to express the
vagueness or imprecise information [51–54].
Definition 1. Let U be the universe of discourse, a fuzzy set A˜ is charac-
terized by a membership function µ
A˜
satisfying
µA˜ : U → [0, 1] (1)
where µA˜(x) is called the membership degree of x ∈ U belonging to fuzzy set
A˜.
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For a finite set A = {x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} , the fuzzy set (A˜, µA˜) is often
denoted by
{
µA˜(x1)
/
x1, . . . ,
µA˜(xi)
/
xi, . . . ,
µA˜(xn)
/
xn
}
. It is easily found that
a fuzzy set is described entirely by its membership function. When µ
A˜
takes
value from {0, 1} , fuzzy set A˜ degenerates into a classical set.
A fuzzy number A˜ is a fuzzy subset of the real number R, and its mem-
bership function is
µA˜(x) : R→ [0, 1] (2)
where x is a real number and there definitely exists an element x0 such
that µA˜(x0) = 1. Triangular fuzzy numbers are the most widely used fuzzy
numbers. A triangular fuzzy number is usually denoted as A˜ = (a1, a2, a3), as
graphically shown in Figure 1, which has the following membership function
µA˜(x) =


0, x < a1
x−a1
a2−a1
a1 ≤ x ≤ a2
a3−x
a3−a2
, a2 ≤ x ≤ a3
0, x > a3
(3)
where a1 < a2 < a3.
In theory and practice, fuzzy numbers are usually associated with linguis-
tic variables to express the fuzzy evaluation to objects. A linguistic variable
is a variable whose values are represented by words or sentences in a natural
or artificial language, for example “Very Low”, “Low”, “Medium”, “High”,
“Very High”, where there values are usually expressed by fuzzy numbers.
In some applications, it may need to transform a fuzzy number to a real
number. There are many approaches proposed for this task. A representative
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Figure 1: Graphically presentation of the triangular fuzzy number
approach is the graded mean integration representation method developed
Chou [55]. Based on that method, given a triangular fuzzy number A˜ =
(a1, a2, a3), its graded mean integration representation is defined as
P (A˜) = (a1 + 4a2 + a3)/6. (4)
2.2. Dempster-Shafer theory
Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) [44, 45], also called belief function theory
or evidence theory, is a popular tool for uncertainty reasoning because of its
advantages in expressing uncertainty [56–58] and handling decision making
[59, 60], clustering and classification [61, 62], failure mode and effects analysis
[63, 64], and other issues [65–67] with uncertainty. This theory needs weaker
conditions than the Bayesian theory of probability, so it is often regarded
as an extension of the Bayesian theory. As a theory of reasoning under
the uncertain environment, DST has an advantage of directly expressing
the “uncertainty” by assigning the basic probability to a set composed of
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multiple objects, rather than to each of the individual objects. In DST, the
information from each information source is seen as a piece of evidence. When
there are more than two pieces of evidence, a combination rule is provided
to fuse them. For completeness of the explanation, a few basic concepts in
DST are introduced as follows.
Let Ω be a set of N mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events,
indicated by
Ω = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θi, · · · , θN} (5)
where set Ω is called a frame of discernment (FOD). The power set of Ω is
indicated by 2Ω, namely
2Ω = {∅, {θ1}, · · · , {θN}, {θ1, θ2}, · · · , {θ1, θ2, · · · , θi}, · · · ,Ω}. (6)
The elements of 2Ω or subsets of Ω are called propositions.
Definition 2. Let a FOD be Ω = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θN}, a mass function defined
on Ω is a mapping m from 2Ω to [0, 1], formally defined by:
m : 2Ω → [0, 1] (7)
which satisfies the following condition:
m(∅) = 0 and
∑
A⊆Ω
m(A) = 1. (8)
In DST, a mass function is also called a basic probability assignment (BPA).
The assigned basic probability m(A) measures the belief exactly assigned to
A and represents how strongly the evidence supports A. If m(A) > 0, A is
9
called a focal element, and the union of all focal elements is called the core
of the mass function.
Given a BPA, its associated belief measure Bel and plausibility measure
P l express the lower bound and upper bound of the support degree to each
proposition in that BPA, respectively. They are defined as
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B), (9)
P l(A) = 1− Bel(A¯) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
m(B), (10)
where A¯ = Ω − A. Obviously, P l(A) ≥ Bel(A) for each A ⊆ Ω, and
[Bel(A), P l(A)] is called the belief interval of A.
If there are two pieces of evidence, a Dempster’s rule of combination is
usually used to combine them. This rule assumes that the BPAs are mutually
independent.
Definition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two BPAs defined on FOD Ω, the Demp-
ster’s rule to combine them, denoted by m = m1 ⊕m2, is defined as follows:
m(A) =


1
1−K
∑
B∩C=A
m1(B)m2(C) , A 6= ∅;
0 , A = ∅.
(11)
with
K =
∑
B∩C=∅
m1(B)m2(C) (12)
where K is a normalization constant, called conflict coefficient between m1
and m2. Note that the Dempster’s rule is only applicable to such two BPAs
which satisfy the condition K < 1.
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The Dempster’s rule plays a very important role in DST, and satisfies
commutative and associative properties, i.e., (i) m1⊕m2 = m2⊕m1 and (ii)
(m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3 = m1 ⊕ (m2 ⊕m3). Thus if there exist multiple BPAs, the
combination of them can be carried out in a pairwise way with any order.
In order to make decision in terms of a BPA, an approach, called pignistic
probability transformation (PPT), is proposed by Smets and Kennes [68] to
derive a distribution of probabilities from the BPA. The PPT function is
defined as follows.
Definition 4. Let m be a BPA on FOD Ω, a PPT function BetPm : Ω →
[0, 1] associated to m is defined by
BetPm(x) =
∑
x∈A,A⊆Ω
1
|A|
m(A)
1−m(∅)
, (13)
where m(∅) 6= 1 and |A| is the cardinality of proposition A.
2.3. Two-person non-constant sum game
Game theory provides a mathematical framework to explain and address
the interactive decision situations where the aims, goals and preferences of
the participating agents are potentially in conflict and it is extensively applied
from economics to biology, and to other disciplines [69–73]. A strategic game
consists of three components which are a finite set of players, a nonempty
set of strategies for each player, and payoff function for each player in ev-
ery strategy combination, respectively. The most commonly used solution
concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium which captures a steady
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state of the play of a strategic game in which each player holds the correct
expectation about the other players’ behavior and acts rationally [74].
Two-person non-constant sum game is a kind of widely addressed game,
such as iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game there are two players,
player 1 and player 2. Assuming player 1 has a finite strategy set S1 including
p strategies, and layer 2 has a finite strategy set S2 including q strategies.
The payoffs of player 1 and player 2 are determined by functions u1(s1, s2)
and u2(s1, s2), respectively, where s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2. A combination of
players’ strategies, denoted as (s∗1, s
∗
2), is a Nash equilibrium of this two-
person non-constant sum game if
u1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(s1, s
∗
2), ∀s1 ∈ S1 (14)
u2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u2(s
∗
1, s2), ∀s2 ∈ S2 (15)
The Nash equilibrium of a two-person non-constant sum game is a self-
enforcing combination of strategies in which no player can gain more by
unilaterally deviating from it.
3. D numbers theory: A generalization of DST on a set with non-
exclusive elements
Although DST has many merits in dealing with uncertain information in-
volving imprecision and ignorance, but it is limited by some hypotheses and
constraints that are often hardly satisfied. Related discussions have been
detailed in some previous studies [42, 43, 50]. In summary, there two mainly
two aspects. At first, in DST the FOD denoted as Ω must be composed by
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mutually exclusive elements. Formally, for any θi, θj ∈ Ω they have to meet
θi ∩ θj = ∅. It is called FOD’s exclusiveness hypothesis. By following the hy-
pothesis, if DST is used in fuzzy linguistic environment, any pair of linguistic
variables such as “Good” and “Very Good” must be exclusive strictly, which
however is questionable. Secondly, in DST the sum of basic probabilities or
beliefs m(·) in a BPA must be 1, which is called BPA’s completeness con-
straint. However, in some cases, due to lack of knowledge and information,
it is possible to obtain an incomplete BPA whose sum of basic probabilities
is less than 1. This incompleteness may be caused by an incomplete FOD
which corresponds to the case of open world environment, or may be from
the lack of information in a closed world environment.
D numbers theory (DNT) is proposed to overcome these limitations men-
tioned above in DST. This theory is a developing theory in which some key
issues still remain unsolved. In [42], Deng first given the definition of D num-
bers and a combination rule for a special form of D numbers, but that rule
is not universal. Besides, in contrast to DST, there are not belief measure
and plausibility measure for D numbers so far, so that the lower bound and
upper bound of the support in a D number to each proposition can not be
derived. In order to let DNT really be a generalization of DST, in this paper
a general rule for combining D numbers is proposed, and the belief measure
and plausibility measure for D numbers are also developed.
3.1. Definition of D numbers
At first, the definition of D numbers is given as follows.
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Definition 5. Let Θ be a nonempty finite set Θ = {F1, F2, · · · , FN}, a D
number is a mapping formulated by
D : 2Θ → [0, 1] (16)
with
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) ≤ 1 and D(∅) = 0 (17)
where ∅ is the empty set and B is a subset of Θ.
From the above definition, a D number is defined on a set with non-
exclusive elements, which means that any pair of elements in Θ, for exam-
ple Fi, Fj ∈ Θ, are not required to be strictly exclusive, i.e. Fi ∩ Fj 6= ∅.
Here, we still call Θ as a FOD, but should note that a FOD in DNT is
a set consisting of non-exclusive elements. Besides, according to Defini-
tion 5, in a D number the information is not required to be complete. If∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) = 1, we say that the D number is information-complete. By con-
trast, if
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) < 1 the D number is information-incomplete. The degree
of information’s completeness in a D number D can be simply expressed by
its Q value Q(D) =
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B). In previous studies, we find that a D number
with incomplete information is hard to handle mathematically. Facing that,
from the view of math a new nonempty set X can be imported to transform
a D number with incomplete information to the information-complete case
by letting D(X) = 1 −
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B). As a result, a new definition about D
numbers is obtained below.
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Definition 6. AD number defined on a nonempty finite set Θ = {F1, F2, · · · , FN}
is a mapping D : 2Θ → [0, 1] satisfying
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) ≤ 1 and D(∅) = 0 (18)
and
D(X) = 1−
∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) (19)
where ∅ is the empty set, B is a subset of Θ, and X is a nonempty set.
If D(X) = 0 and Θ becomes a set of mutually exclusive elements, the
D number will be completely reduced to a BPA in DST. Therefore, D num-
ber is a generalization of BPA. In addition, since in DNT a D number allows∑
B⊆Θ
D(B) < 1, it is very similar with the open world assumption in the trans-
ferable belief model (TBM) of DST [75]. But DNT is essentially different
from TBM. At first, in contrast to TBM which implements the open world
assumption by letting m(∅) > 0, DNT holds D(∅) = 0 and lets D(X) > 0
instead. Secondly, in TBM ∅ represents all elements that are not included in
the FOD, thus the exclusiveness is still hold between FOD and ∅. However,
in DNT X can have an intersection with FOD Θ, even becoming the subset
of Θ. Only if X 6⊂ Θ and D(X) > 0, the open world assumption is hold.
Hence, a D number with incomplete information (i.e. D(X) > 0) does not
absolutely correspond to the open world environment.
3.2. FOD’s non-exclusiveness in DNT
As mentioned above, in DNT the elements of FOD Θ are not required to
be mutually exclusive, which means that Fi may be not completely exclusive
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to Fj for any Fi, Fj ∈ Θ and Fi ∩ Fj = ∅. As a natural generalization, the
concept of non-exclusiveness can be extended to the subsets of Θ from the
elements of Θ: for two nonempty sets Bi, Bj ⊆ Θ and Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, Bi may
be also not completely exclusive to Bj. Further, the non-exclusiveness can
be applied to Θ ∪ X where D(X) expresses the incomplete information in
DNT as shown in Definition 6. In order to quantitatively represent the non-
exclusiveness in Θ ∪X , a membership function is developed to measure the
non-exclusive degrees.
Definition 7. Given Bi, Bj ∈ 2
Θ∪X , the non-exclusive degree between Bi
and Bj is characterized by a mapping u¬E:
u¬E : 2
Θ∪X × 2Θ∪X → [0, 1] (20)
with
u¬E(Bi, Bj) =


1, Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅
p, Bi ∩ Bj = ∅
(21)
and
u¬E(Bi, Bj) = u¬E(Bj , Bi) (22)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. If letting the exclusive degree between Bi and Bj be
denoted as uE, then uE = 1− u¬E.
According to Definition 7, the non-exclusive degree between Bi and Bj is
1 if Bi and Bj have intersections, otherwise u¬E(Bi, Bj) is p taking a value
from [0, 1]. Obviously, if u¬E(Bi, Bj) = 0 for any Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, the FOD
Θ in DNT is degenerated to classical FOD in DST. As expressed above, the
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non-exclusiveness of FOD is one of the most important properties in DNT. In
our previous studies [43, 76], a simple approach is developped to calculate all
non-exclusive degrees in power set space 2Θ∪X if we have the non-exclusive
degrees of any pair of elements in Θ ∪X , which is presented as follows
u¬E(Bi, Bj) = max
x∈Bi,y∈Bj
{u¬E(x, y)} (23)
where Bi, Bj ∈ 2
Θ∪X . A numerical example is given below to illustrate the
approach shown in Eq. (23).
Example 1. Supposing there is a set of linguistic variables Θ = {V P, P,MP,M,MG,G, V G}
in which every linguistic variable is represented by a triangular fuzzy number
given in Table 1 and graphically presented as Figure 2. The set Θ is seen as
a FOD, and let D(X) represent the possible incomplete information in DNT.
For simplicity, it is assumed that u¬E(F,X) = 0 for any F ∈ Θ. Now the
non-exclusive degrees between elements in 2Θ∪X .
At first, we calculate the non-exclusive degrees between elements in FOD
Θ. For that purpose, in this paper the areas of fuzzy numbers are uti-
lized. Let A˜, B˜ be two fuzzy numbers with membership functions µA˜(x)
and µB˜(x), respectively. And the intersection of A˜ and B˜ is denoted as
A˜ ∩ B˜ with membership function µA˜∩B˜(x) = min{µA˜(x), µB˜(x)}. Corre-
spondingly, A˜ ∪ B˜ indicates the union of A˜ and B˜ whose membership func-
tion is µA˜∪B˜(x) = max{µA˜(x), µB˜(x)}. Then, we define the non-exclusive
degree between A˜ and B˜ as
u¬E(A˜, B˜) =
AreaA˜∩B˜
Area
A˜∪B˜
(24)
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Table 1: Fuzzy linguistic variables and corresponding fuzzy numbers
Linguistic variable Fuzzy number
Very Poor (VP) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)
Poor (P) (0.10, 0.25, 0.39)
Medium Poor (MP) (0.25, 0.39, 0.53)
Medium (M) (0.39, 0.53, 0.68)
Medium Good (MG) (0.53, 0.68, 0.86)
Good (G) (0.68, 0.86, 0.97)
Very Good (VG) (0.86, 1.00, 1.00)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Assessment value
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
M
em
be
rs
hi
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ee
VP P MP M MG G VG
Figure 2: Graphically presentation of fuzzy linguistic variables
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where AreaA˜∩B˜ and AreaA˜∪B˜ represent the areas of fuzzy numbers A˜ ∩ B˜
and A˜ ∪ B˜, respectively. Based on Eq. (24), and Figure 2, and the assumed
u¬E(F,X) = 0, ∀F ∈ Θ, each non-exclusive degree between elements in
Θ ∪X , therefore, can be obtained as shown in the following matrix
V P P MP M MG G VG X
V P
P
MP
M
MG
G
V G
X


1 0.116 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.116 1 0.140 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.140 1 0.140 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.140 1 0.138 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.138 1 0.170 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.170 1 0.127 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.127 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


At second, once having the above non-exclusive degree matrix of between
elements in Θ∪X , according to Eq. (23) we can calculate the non-exclusive
degree of any pair of elements in 2Θ∪X . For example, as for {V P, P} and
{MP,X}, we have
u¬E({V P, P}, {MP,X})
= max{u¬E({V P,MP}), u¬E({V P,X}), u¬E({P,MP}), u¬E({P,X})}
= max{0, 0, 0.140, 0}
= 0.140.
The other non-exclusive degrees between elements in 2Θ∪X can also be derived
by the means.
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3.3. Belief measure and plausibility measure for D numbers
In previous studies, the belief and plausibility for D numbers are not
addressed. By considering the non-exclusiveness of FOD in DNT, in this
paper we propose a belief measure and a plausibility measure for D numbers
as follows.
Definition 8. Let D represent a D number defined on Θ and D(X) express
the incomplete information in D, for any proposition A ⊆ Θ ∪ X , its belief
measure Bel : 2Θ∪X → [0, 1] is defined as
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
D(B), (25)
and its plausibility measure P l : 2Θ∪X → [0, 1] is defined as
P l(A) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
D(B) +
∑
B∩A=∅
u¬E(B,A)D(B), (26)
where B ⊆ Θ ∪X .
For the above definition, because u¬E(B,A) = 1 for B ∩ A 6= ∅, the
plausibility measure P l can be rewritten as
P l(A) =
∑
B⊆Θ∪X
u¬E(B,A)D(B). (27)
As same as DST, [Bel(A), P l(A)] is called the belief interval of A in DNT,
which expresses the lower bound and upper bound of support degree to propo-
sition A. And it is easy to find that the Bel and P l for D numbers will
degenerate to classical belief measure and plausibility measure in DST if the
associated D number is a BPA in fact.
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3.4. Combination rule for D numbers
How to combine pieces of information is a crucial issue in the theory
of information fusion. Ideally, a combination rule for D numbers should be
degenerated to the Dempster’s rule of combination under a certain conditions,
since DNT is designed as a generalization of DST. The rule given in [42]
is obviously not satisfactory, and its application is limited since that rule
is not universal. In a very recent study [43], we given new combination
rules for D numbers with complete information and incomplete information,
respectively, from a perspective of conflict redistribution [44, 77, 78]. By
reexamining the rules given in [43], we find that they do not well address
the case of information-incompleteness and import a D numbers’ Q values
related function which is difficulty determined in practice. In this paper,
by inheriting the idea in [43], we present a uniform combination rule for
D numbers with complete information and incomplete information. The
proposed uniform rule is universal for any forms of D numbers and can be
totally reduced to Dempster’s rule of DST.
Definition 9. Let D1, D2 be two D numbers defined on Θ, and D1(X),
D2(X) express the incomplete information in D1 and D2 respectively. The
combination of D1 and D2, indicated by D = D1 ⊙D2, is defined by
D(A) =


0, A = ∅
1
1−KD


∑
B∩C=A
D1(B)D2(C) +
∑
B∪C=A
B∩C=∅
u¬E(B,C)D1(B)D2(C)

 , A 6= ∅
(28)
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with
KD =
∑
B∩C=∅
(1− u¬E(B,C))D1(B)D2(C), (29)
where A,B,C ⊆ Θ ∪X.
From Definition 9, the presented rule essentially is a redistribution of
exclusive conflict, therefore it is called the exclusive conflict’s redistribu-
tion (ECR) rule. The proposed ECR rule simultaneously considers the non-
exclusiveness of FOD and possible information-incompleteness in D numbers.
In this rule, the conflict and incomplete information are represented by ∅ and
X , respectively. And it can be completely degenerated to classical Demp-
ster’s rule of DST if u¬E(B,C) = 0 for any B ∩ C = ∅ and D1(X) = 0,
D2(X) = 0. A numerical example is given below to show the combination
process of D numbers by means of the ECR rule.
Example 2. Assume there are two D numbers defined on Θ = {a, b}:
D1({a}) = 0.5, D1({b}) = 0.2, D1({a, b}) = 0.1, D1({X}) = 0.2;
D2({a}) = 0.4, D2({b}) = 0.3, D2({a, b}) = 0.2, D2({X}) = 0.1.
And the non-exclusive degrees between subsets of Θ ∪X are assumed in
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the following matrix:
{X} {b} {b,X} {a} {a,X} {a, b} {a, b,X}
{X}
{b}
{b,X}
{a}
{a,X}
{a, b}
{a, b,X}


1 0.1 1 0.2 1 0.2 1
0.1 1 1 0.1 0.1 1 1
1 1 1 0.2 1 1 1
0.2 0.1 0.2 1 1 1 1
1 0.1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1


The combination result of D1 and D2 can be obtained through the follow-
ing steps. At first, an intersection/union table is calculated as shown Table
2, where each item is derived by either D1(B)D2(C) assigned to B ∩ C if
B ∩ C 6= ∅ or u¬E(B,C)D1(B)D2(C) assigned to B ∪ C if B ∩ C = ∅.
Table 2: Intersection/union table in combining D1 and D2
D1 ⊙D2 D2({a}) = 0.4 D2({b}) = 0.3 D2({a, b}) = 0.2 D2({X}) = 0.1
D1({a}) = 0.5 {a} (0.2) {a, b} (0.015) {a} (0.1) {a,X} (0.01)
D1({b}) = 0.2 {a, b} (0.008) {b} (0.06) {b} (0.04) {b,X} (0.002)
D1({a, b}) = 0.1 {a} (0.04) {b} (0.03) {a, b} (0.02) {a, b,X} (0.002)
D1({X}) = 0.2 {a,X} (0.016) {b,X} (0.006) {a, b,X} (0.008) {X} (0.02)
Then according to Eq. (29), we can have the conflict coefficient KD =
0.423. Therefore, in terms of Eq. (28) the final result of combining D1 and
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D2 is obtained
D({a}) = 0.589,
D({b}) = 0.225,
D({a, b}) = 0.075,
D({X}) = 0.035,
D({a,X}) = 0.045,
D({b,X}) = 0.014,
D({a, b,X}) = 0.017.
It must be pointed out that the proposed ECR rule in Definition 9 satisfies
the commutative property, i.e. D1 ⊙ D2 = D2 ⊙ D1, but does not preserve
the associative property, namely (D1 ⊙ D2) ⊙ D3 6= D1 ⊙ (D2 ⊙ D3) 6=
(D1 ⊙ D3) ⊙ D2. In the theory of information fusion, there are two main
schemes when combining pieces of information [79]. One is the aggregating
scheme where evidences represent different opinions about the same event,
the other is the updating scheme in which evidences express sequential opin-
ions about a dynamic event. For the commutative and associative rules, such
as the Dempster’s rule, there is no difference between these two schemes. But
for the non-associative rules, the two schemes provide different results. In
DNT, the ECR rule is naturally suitable for the updating scheme, but is not
appropriate to be used in the aggregating scheme. Facing that, a weighted
average combination (WAC) method is suggested to combine multiple D
numbers about the same event based on the proposed ECR rule.
Suppose there are n D numbers indicated by D1, D2, · · ·, Dn, and every
D number is given a weighting factor wi, i = 1, · · · , n, satisfying
n∑
i=1
wi = 1.
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At first, the averaging D number among D1, D2, · · ·, Dn is defined as
D¯(B) =
n∑
i=1
wiDi(B). (30)
Then, the result of combining D1, D2, · · ·, Dn is obtained by
DWAC =
n
⊙
i=1
D¯i (31)
where D¯i = D¯, i = 1, · · · , n, and ⊙ is the ECR rule given in Definition 9.
4. Proposed D numbers theory based game-theoretic framework
In this section, a DNT based game-theoretic framework is proposed for ad-
versarial decision making under uncertain environment, whose flow diagram
is graphically shown in Figure 3. Underlying this framework, a two-person
non-constant sum game is considered. The framework mainly consists of four
phases including “Game analysis”, “Strategy assessment”, “Payoff matrix
construction”, and “Equilibrium calculation”, respectively. In the following
text, we briefly describe these phases, leaving the details in the next section
to explain via an illustrative application.
Phase 1. By means of a formed decision making group (DMG), in the phase
of game analysis the players in the game are easily determined at
first. Then, the DMG will define a strategy set for each player by
analyzing the current decision making situation.
Phase 2. In the phase of strategy assessment, the main task is to evaluate
the strategies of each player. At first, the decision making criteria
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1.1 Determining players
1.2 Defining strategies
2.1 Identifying criteria
2.2 Defining fuzzy linguistic variables
2.3 Evaluating each strategy by using fuzzy 
linguistic variables
3.1 Constructing D numbers-valued MCDM 
matrix
3.2 Generating D numbers-valued payoff 
matrix by fusing all evaluations on the criteria
Phase 2: 
Strategy assessment
Phase 3: Payoff matrix construction
Phase 4: 
Equilibrium calculation
Phase 1:
Game analysis
3.3 Forming real-valued payoff matrix via 
defuzzification 
4.1 Finding equilibrium points
4.2 Determining the optimal equilibrium
4.3 Approval of the 
equilibrium
Generating an action plan to implement
Forming a decision making 
group
No
Yes
Figure 3: Flow diagram of the proposed DNT based game-theoretic framework
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are identified as the basis of assessment. Secondly, by considering
an uncertain decision making environment, we define fuzzy linguis-
tic variables to express the uncertainty in the evaluations. Based
on the criteria and linguistic variables determined previously, each
strategy for each player is evaluated by the DMG. As a result, a
multi-experts and multi-criteria decision making matrix with fuzzy
evaluations is formed for every strategy of each player.
Phase 3. The third phase is to construct the payoff matrix of the game. For
the decision making matrix of each strategy, firstly we collect the
evaluations from multi-experts on every criterion and express them
in a D number, which is to construct a D numbers-valued MCDM
matrix for every strategy. Then, we combine these D numbers on
different criteria for every strategy to generate a D numbers-valued
payoff matrix, where the fusion of evaluations on multi-criteria is
implemented. At last, in order to calculate the equilibria of the
game, the generated D numbers-valued payoff matrix is converted
to a real-valued payoff matrix via the defuzzification of D numbers.
Phase 4. In the phase of equilibrium calculation, all equilibria of the game
will be found at first according to the real-valued payoff matrix
obtained above. Evidently, there are two cases about the found
equilibria. One is that there is only an equilibrium point, in this
case the unique equilibrium naturally become the outcome of the
game. The other is that there are at least two equilibrium points,
in the case we must choose an optimal equilibrium point as the out-
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come of the game. In game theory, different approach may yield
different optimal equilibrium point, where each optimal equilibrium
is associated with different point of view on “optimal”. The deter-
mination of the optimal equilibrium is on the basis of practical
applications and specific demands, therefore it is not the focus of
the study. By some means an optimal equilibrium is assumed to be
determined, the DMG will re-examine the equilibrium prudently. If
the optimal equilibrium is not satisfactory, a new equilibrium point
will be required; Otherwise, if it is approved, the optimal equilib-
rium will be used to generate the action plan for the adversarial
decision making.
5. An illustrative application
In this section, an example adapted from reference [29] is given to il-
lustrate the process of applying the proposed DNT based game-theoretic
framework and verify its effectiveness. For more details about the applica-
tion, please refer to [29].
In this application, it is assumed that there is a territorial dispute between
two countries Alpha and Beta about the belonging of a buffer zone (BZ), as
shown in Figure 4. Recently, Beta unilaterally claims that the BZ belongs
to it. For this reason, Alpha call for an international aid against Beta’s
demand. United Nations send and located international peace support force
to control the area. Regarding to this situation, the conflict between countries
is formalized in two-person non-constant game theory and analyzed by the
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Figure 4: An example of adversarial decision making about territorial dispute [29]
proposed DNT based game-theoretic framework. Before the analysis, it is
assumed a DMG consisting of ten decision makers (DM) is established in
advance.
5.1. Game analysis
In this phase, the DMG is to determine the players in the game and define
possible strategies for each player. Regarding the players, obviously there are
two players, namely Alpha and Beta. Regarding the strategies, by following
reference [29] it is assumed that there are five strategies for Alpha and four
strategies for Beta.
The strategies of Alpha are
• AS1: Main and rear area control
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• AS2: Sector control
• AS3: Area control as whole
• AS4: Strong area control as whole
• AS5: Area control with local forces
The strategies of Beta are
• BS1: Attack by itself
• BS2: Corporate attack
• BS3: Passive attitude
• BS4: Ownership of conflict zone (BZ)
5.2. Strategy assessment
In the phase of strategy assessment, at first we identify key criteria so as
to evaluate the strategies for players. In previous study [29], six key crite-
ria have been identified, including “Management”, “Protection”, “Mobility”,
“Logistic”, “Flexibility”, “Simplicity”, and a fuzzy weigh for every criterion
has been also determined, as shown in Table 3.
Secondly, a group of fuzzy linguistic terms should be defined for the sake
of expressing DM’s uncertain evaluations to the strategies. In the paper, the
linguistic variables given in Table 1 are employed directly. These linguistic
variables, ranked from “Very Poor” (VP) to “Very Good” (VG), constitute
a scale of seven grades, as graphically shown in Figure 2.
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Table 3: Fuzzy weights for criteria
Criterion Fuzzy weight
Management (C1) (0.53, 0.91, 1.00)
Protection (C2) (0.39, 0.66, 1.00)
Mobility (C3) (0.10, 0.41, 0.68)
Logistic (C4) (0.25, 0.60, 1.00)
Flexibility (C5) (0.39, 0.82, 1.00)
Simplicity (C6) (0.10, 0.49, 1.00)
Thirdly, according to the criteria identified above, the DMG is to evaluate
these strategies for each player by using the defined fuzzy linguistic variables.
Different from conventional MCDM process, each evaluation matrix is estab-
lished by given opposite player’s strategies from a game theory perspective
since the application is in an adversarial decision making environment. For
example, Table 4 gives the evaluations to Alpha’s all strategies in the case
of Beta choosing BS1 as its strategy, which is abbreviated as BS1 Case for
short. And since there are ten decision makers in the DMG, Table 4 is also
an evaluation matrix of a group decision making. By means of this way, we
can obtain the other evaluation matrices, namely BS2 Case, BS3 Case, BS4
Case for Alpha, and AS1 Case, AS2 Case, AS3 Case, AS4 Case, AS5 Case
for Beta. In this paper, all of the evaluation matrices are from literature [29].
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Table 4: AS’s evaluations according to criteria with linguistic variables (BS1 Case)
Criterion Strategy DM 1 DM 2 DM 3 DM 4 DM 5 DM 6 DM 7 DM 8 DM 9 DM 10
C1 AS1 MG MG M MG G G G MG G G
AS2 G G MG M VG G MG MG VG M
AS3 P VP VP VP VP VP VP P VP VP
AS4 VP P P VP MP P P P P MP
AS5 P VP VP P VP VP VP P P VP
C2 AS1 M MP M M MP P G MG MG MG
AS2 G M M G M M MG MP M MP
AS3 MP VP VP P VP P VP P MP P
AS4 MP MP VP P MP M MP P M VP
AS5 VP MP MP VP MP VP VP VP VP MP
C3 AS1 VG VG MG VG VG G VG MG MG VG
AS2 VG MG G VG MG VG VG VG MG MG
AS3 MP M P P M P P P P P
AS4 MG MG M MG MG MG M M MP G
AS5 MP VP P P VP M VP VP P M
C4 AS1 VG VG VG MG VG VG VG VG G VG
AS2 G MG G MG M M MG G G P
AS3 G MP MP P M P MP MP M MP
AS4 M M M MP P MP M P M P
AS5 MP VP MP P M P P MP P MP
C5 AS1 MP VG MP M VP G M MG G MP
AS2 G G G MG M MG M M MG MG
AS3 MP MP VP P VP M VP P P MP
AS4 MP M P P P P P MP VP P
AS5 VP MP P VP MP MG VP P VP M
C6 AS1 MG M G MG G MG G G MG G
AS2 MP MG M MP M MG MG MG MG MG
AS3 M M MG M MG M M MG M MG
AS4 MP MP M MG M MP MP M M MP
AS5 P P MP MG MP MP P MG M M
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5.3. Payoff matrix construction
Through the above two phases, nine game-theoretic evaluation matrices
have been established for each player’s strategies. But it is difficult to find the
solution (or equilibrium point) of the adversarial decision making problem
directly based on these evaluation matrices. We must construct a payoff
matrix for this game in terms of the evaluation matrices. During the process,
it will implement the fusion of evaluations from multiple decision makers and
multiple criteria, where DNT is used to deal with these non-exclusive fuzzy
evaluations.
Firstly, for every strategy we transform the fuzzy evaluations on the same
criterion given by ten decision makers into a D number to realize the fusion
of multiple experts. For example, in Table 4, for Alpha’s strategy AS1, on C1
four decision makers give the evaluation of MG, one gives M, and the other
five give G. By assuming these decision makers have the same importance,
hence a D number is generated as follows

D(MG) = 0.4,
D(M) = 0.1,
D(G) = 0.5
Here, the above D number is simply denoted as ({MG}, 0.4; {M}, 0.1;
{G}, 0.5). Via this means, all fuzzy evaluations can be integrated and re-
expressed by D numbers. In this application, all the obtained D numbers
are information-complete. As a result, every fuzzy evaluation matrix, like
BS1 Case in Table 4, is transformed to a D numbers-valued MCDM matrix.
Table 5 shows the D numbers-valued MCDM matrix derived from Table 4.
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Table 5: D numbers-valued MCDM matrix (BS1 Case)
Criterion Strategy Evaluation
C1 AS1 ({M}, 0.1; {MG}, 0.4; {G}, 0.5)
AS2 ({M}, 0.2; {MG}, 0.3; {G}, 0.3; {VG}, 0.2)
AS3 ({VP}, 0.8; {P}, 0.2)
AS4 ({VP}, 0.2; {P}, 0.6; {MP}, 0.2)
AS5 ({VP}, 0.6; {P}, 0.4)
C2 AS1 ({P}, 0.1; {MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.3; {MG}, 0.3; {G}, 0.1)
AS2 ({MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.5; {MG}, 0.1; {G}, 0.2)
AS3 ({VP}, 0.4; {P}, 0.4; {MP}, 0.2)
AS4 ({VP}, 0.2; {P}, 0.2; {MP}, 0.4; {M}, 0.2)
AS5 ({VP}, 0.6; {MP}, 0.4)
C3 AS1 ({MG}, 0.3; {G}, 0.1; {VG}, 0.6)
AS2 ({MG}, 0.4; {G}, 0.1; {VG}, 0.5)
AS3 ({P}, 0.7; {MP}, 0.1; {M}, 0.2)
AS4 ({MP}, 0.1; {M}, 0.3; {MG}, 0.5; {G}, 0.1)
AS5 ({VP}, 0.4; {P}, 0.3; {MP}, 0.1; {M}, 0.2)
C4 AS1 ({MG}, 0.1; {G}, 0.1; {VG}, 0.8)
AS2 ({P}, 0.1; {M}, 0.2; {MG}, 0.3; {G}, 0.4)
AS3 ({P}, 0.2; {MP}, 0.5; {M}, 0.2; {G}, 0.1)
AS4 ({P}, 0.3; {MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.5)
AS5 ({VP}, 0.1; {P}, 0.4; {MP}, 0.4; {M}, 0.1)
C5 AS1 ({VP}, 0.1; {MP}, 0.3; {M}, 0.2; {MG}, 0.1; {G}, 0.2; {VG}, 0.1)
AS2 ({M}, 0.3; {MG}, 0.4; {G}, 0.3)
AS3 ({VP}, 0.3; {P}, 0.3; {MP}, 0.3; {M}, 0.1)
AS4 ({VP}, 0.1; {P}, 0.6; {MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.1)
AS5 ({VP}, 0.4; {P}, 0.2; {MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.1; {MG}, 0.1)
C6 AS1 ({M}, 0.1; {MG}, 0.4; {G}, 0.5)
AS2 ({MP}, 0.2; {M}, 0.2; {MG}, 0.6)
AS3 ({M}, 0.6; {MG}, 0.4)
AS4 ({MP}, 0.5; {M}, 0.4; {MG}, 0.1)
AS5 ({P}, 0.3; {MP}, 0.3; {M}, 0.2; {MG}, 0.2)
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Secondly, the evaluations to every strategy on different criteria, now ex-
pressed by D numbers, are fused to derive an integrated evaluation to each
strategy. This is a typical fusion process of evaluations on multiple crite-
ria, but the data is expressed by D numbers. Within the process, the ECR
based WAC method, shown in Eqs. (30) and (31), is used to combine mul-
tiple D numbers, where the weight factors of D numbers are derived from
the fuzzy weights of criteria given in Table 3. At the firs step, the fuzzy
weights given in Table 3 are transformed to crisp values by using Eq. (4),
we have P (C1) = 0.862, P (C2) = 0.672, P (C3) = 0.403, P (C4) = 0.608,
P (C5) = 0.778, P (C6) = 0.510. At the second step, these crisp values are
normalized as the weight factors of the criteria, namely
wC1 = 0.225, wC2 = 0.175, wC3 = 0.105,
wC4 = 0.159, wC5 = 0.203, wC6 = 0.133.
Now we can fuse the evaluations on all criteria for every strategy. Let’s use
strategy AS1 as the example. From Table 5, given Beta’s strategy BS1 the
evaluations to AS1 are
• OnC1: D
C1
AS1|BS1
({M}) = 0.1, DC1
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.4, DC1
AS1|BS1
({G}) =
0.5;
• OnC2: D
C2
AS1|BS1
({P}) = 0.1, DC2
AS1|BS1
({MP}) = 0.2, DC2
AS1|BS1
({M}) =
0.3, DC2
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.3, DC2
AS1|BS1
({G}) = 0.1;
• OnC3: D
C3
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.3, DC3
AS1|BS1
({G}) = 0.1, DC3
AS1|BS1
({V G}) =
0.6;
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• OnC4: D
C4
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.1, DC4
AS1|BS1
({G}) = 0.1, DC4
AS1|BS1
({V G}) =
0.8;
• OnC5: D
C5
AS1|BS1
({V P}) = 0.1, DC5
AS1|BS1
({MP}) = 0.3, DC5
AS1|BS1
({M}) =
0.2, DC5
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.1, DC5
AS1|BS1
({G}) = 0.2, DC5
AS1|BS1
({V G}) =
0.1;
• OnC6: D
C6
AS1|BS1
({M}) = 0.1, DC6
AS1|BS1
({MG}) = 0.4, DC6
AS1|BS1
({G}) =
0.5.
Based on the weight factors calculated above, the averaging D number of
DC1
AS1|BS1
,DC2
AS1|BS1
,DC3
AS1|BS1
,DC4
AS1|BS1
,DC5
AS1|BS1
,DC6
AS1|BS1
, denoted as D¯AS1|BS1 ,
therefore, is
D¯AS1|BS1({V G}) = 0.210,
D¯AS1|BS1({G}) = 0.263,
D¯AS1|BS1({MG}) = 0.263,
D¯AS1|BS1({M}) = 0.129,
D¯AS1|BS1({MP}) = 0.096,
D¯AS1|BS1({P}) = 0.018,
D¯AS1|BS1({V P}) = 0.020.
Then, based on the non-exclusive degrees calculated in Example 1 and Eq.
(31), given Beta’s strategy BS1 the integrated evaluation to strategy AS1,
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denoted as DAS1|BS1 , can be obtained
DAS1|BS1({V G}) = 0.089,
DAS1|BS1({G}) = 0.378,
DAS1|BS1({G, V G}) = 0.037,
DAS1|BS1({MG}) = 0.344,
DAS1|BS1({MG,G}) = 0.089,
DAS1|BS1({MG,G, V G}) = 0.011,
DAS1|BS1({M}) = 0.020,
DAS1|BS1({M,MG}) = 0.019,
DAS1|BS1({M,MG,G}) = 0.007,
DAS1|BS1({M,MG,G, V G}) = 0.001,
DAS1|BS1({MP}) = 0.002,
DAS1|BS1({MP,M}) = 0.001,
DAS1|BS1({MP,M,MG}) = 0.001
where the terms whose beliefs are smaller than 0.001 are not displayed. From
the perspective of game theory, DAS1|BS1 represents the payoff of Alpha’s
strategy AS1 given BS1 chosen by Beta. By this means, the payoff of each
strategy, either Alpha’s or Beta’s, given opposite player’s a strategy, can be
obtained. These payoffs are used to form a D numbers-valued payoff matrix
for the game, as shown in Table 6.
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Table 6: D numbers-valued payoff matrix for the game
Beta
BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4
Alpha AS1 (DAS1|BS1 , DBS1|AS1) (DAS1|BS2, DBS2|AS1) (DAS1|BS3 , DBS3|AS1) (DAS1|BS4, DBS4|AS1)
AS2 (DAS2|BS1 , DBS1|AS2) (DAS2|BS2, DBS2|AS2) (DAS2|BS3 , DBS3|AS2) (DAS2|BS4, DBS4|AS2)
AS3 (DAS3|BS1 , DBS1|AS3) (DAS3|BS2, DBS2|AS3) (DAS3|BS3 , DBS3|AS3) (DAS3|BS4, DBS4|AS3)
AS4 (DAS4|BS1 , DBS1|AS4) (DAS4|BS2, DBS2|AS4) (DAS4|BS3 , DBS3|AS4) (DAS4|BS4, DBS4|AS4)
AS5 (DAS5|BS1 , DBS1|AS5) (DAS5|BS2, DBS2|AS5) (DAS5|BS3 , DBS3|AS5) (DAS5|BS4, DBS4|AS5)38
Thirdly, we will transform the D numbers-valued payoff matrix to a real-
valued payoff matrix since currently it is difficult to find the equilibria of a
game with D numbers-valued payoffs. The process is decomposed into three
steps. At the first step, we simply use the PPT function in Definition 4 to
derive a distribution of probabilities from each D numbers-valued payoff. For
example, the distribution of probabilities derived from DAS1|BS1 is
DISAS1|BS1(V P ) = 0.000,
DISAS1|BS1(P ) = 0.000,
DISAS1|BS1(MP ) = 0.002,
DISAS1|BS1(M) = 0.033,
DISAS1|BS1(MG) = 0.405,
DISAS1|BS1(G) = 0.448,
DISAS1|BS1(V G) = 0.112.
At the second step, every distribution of probabilities DISASi|BSj , as a form
of payoff, is further transformed to a fuzzy payoff by the following formula
P˜ASi|BSj =
∑
A∈Θ
DISASi|BSj (A)× µA(x) (32)
where Θ = {V P, P,MP,M,MG,G, V G} whose elements are fuzzy linguistic
variables given in Table 1, and µA(x) is the membership function of fuzzy
number A, A ∈ Θ. In terms of Eq. (32), as for DISAS1|BS1 we have
P˜AS1|BS1 = (0.629, 0.791, 0.918).
Similarly, given BS1 the fuzzy payoffs of Alpha’s other strategies are calcu-
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lated
P˜AS2|BS1 = (0.533, 0.687, 0.847),
P˜AS3|BS1 = (0.075, 0.156, 0.346),
P˜AS4|BS1 = (0.173, 0.317, 0.460),
P˜AS5|BS1 = (0.049, 0.100, 0.312).
Figure 5 graphically shows the above fuzzy payoffs of Alpha’s strategies given
BS1 chosen by Beta. At the third step, these fuzzy payoffs will be trans-
formed to real-valued payoffs via the defuzzification. In this paper, the cen-
troid defuzzification method [80] is used, which is presented as follows
defuzzy(P˜ ) =
∫
xµP˜ (x)dx∫
µP˜ (x)dx
. (33)
Therefore, given BS1 chosen by Beta the real-valued payoffs of Alpha’s strate-
gies are
defuzzy(P˜AS1|BS1) = 0.779,
defuzzy(P˜AS2|BS1) = 0.689,
defuzzy(P˜AS3|BS1) = 0.192,
defuzzy(P˜AS4|BS1) = 0.317,
defuzzy(P˜AS5|BS1) = 0.154.
From the results, if Beta chooses BS1 as its strategy, Alpha’s best response is
strategy AS1. Through the above three steps, the D numbers-valued payoff
matrix in Table 6 is transformed to a real-valued payoff matrix which is
shown in Table 7.
5.4. Equilibrium calculation
In the phase, the equilibrium points of the game can be easily calculated
based on the obtained real-valued payoff matrix. From Table 7, it is found
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Figure 5: Fuzzy payoffs of Alpha’s strategies given BS1 chosen by Beta
Table 7: Real-valued payoff matrix for the game
Beta
BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4
Alpha AS1 (0.779, 0.586) (0.700, 0.508) (0.742, 0.609) (0.680, 0.757)
AS2 (0.689, 0.561) (0.830, 0.356) (0.648, 0.524) (0.377, 0.842)
AS3 (0.192, 0.676) (0.218, 0.531) (0.790, 0.835) (0.662, 0.828)
AS4 (0.317, 0.633) (0.347, 0.578) (0.734, 0.786) (0.499, 0.734)
AS5 (0.154, 0.753) (0.200, 0.606) (0.937, 0.781) (0.854, 0.717)
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that there is only an equilibrium point (AS5, BS3). Therefore, it is not
necessary to conduct the selection of optimal equilibrium, and (AS5, BS3)
is automatically approved to be the equilibrium to generate every player’s
action plan. Thus, in the example of territorial dispute between two counties
Alpha and Beta, the players will choose AS5 and BS3 as their action plans,
respectively.
5.5. Comparison and discussion
Let us compare the result obtained by the proposed DNT based frame-
work or method with that by a TOPSIS based method developed in [29]. On
the basis of the same data, a real-valued payoff matrix for the application
is also derived by using the TOPSIS based method [29], which is shown in
Table 8. In terms of Tables 7 and 8, we can compare the DNT based method
and TOPSIS based method as follows.
At first, from Table 8 the equilibrium point is also (AS5, BS3) by using the
TOPSIS based method, which is the same as the result of this paper that uses
the DNT based method. Both of these two methods have obtained correct
result. Therefore, the two methods are both effective for the adversarial
decision making under fuzzy environment.
Secondly, by looking into the payoffs of players at the equilibrium point
(AS5, BS3), the DNT based method and TOPSIS based method both obtain
that Alpha has gained the maximum payoff among its all possible payoffs,
while Beta can just get a relatively high payoff at the equilibrium point.
Since the goals of players are usually in conflict in a game, players do not
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Table 8: Obtained real-valued payoff matrix for the application by using a TOPSIS based
method in [29]
Beta
BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4
Alpha AS1 (0.519, 0.465) (0.510, 0.432) (0.500, 0.489) (0.507, 0.546)
AS2 (0.510, 0.472) (0.554, 0.423) (0.489, 0.451) (0.451, 0.552)
AS3 (0.352, 0.477) (0.373, 0.431) (0.505, 0.488) (0.487, 0.540)
AS4 (0.375, 0.465) (0.391, 0.480) (0.517, 0.489) (0.469, 0.500)
AS5 (0.338, 0.507) (0.322, 0.441) (0.554, 0.520) (0.531, 0.513)
simultaneously achieve the maximum interests. Both of the two methods
have effectively reflected this characteristic of adversarial decision making.
Thirdly, we examine the ranking of strategies. Table 9 shows the rank-
ings of Alpha’s strategies for every Beta’s strategy in the two methods, and
Table 10 gives the rankings of Beta’s strategies for all Alpha’s strategies. In
these tables, the differences between rankings obtained by the DNT based
method and TOPSIS based method are highlighted. Since the determination
of equilibria is only based on the top 1 strategies (as known as best responses
in game theory) of Alpha and Beta, we just pay the attention on the best
responses. As seen from Tables 9 and 10, in most cases, except AS3 and
AS4, the best responses obtained by the two methods for Alpha and Beta
are the same. Given AS3 or AS4 as Alpha’s strategy, Beta’s best response is
BS3 in terms of the DNT based method, while BS4 by using TOPSIS based
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method. From Table 9, as for player Alpha, strategy AS5 has two times
to be the best response, which is the most among Alpha’s strategies, either
using the DNT based method or using TOPSIS based method. While for
player Beta, from Table 10 BS3 is the strategy having the most times (three
times) to be the best response if using the DNT based method, and it is
BS4 (four times) if using the TOPSIS based method. Hence, the most likely
strategies of Alpha and Beta, determined by the TOPSIS based method, are
respectively AS5 and BS4, while the equilibrium found through the same
method is (AS5, BS3). As written in [29], “Any information gathered during
execution phase, may orient DM (decision maker) to other directions”. In
using the TOPSIS based method, the found most likely strategies and equi-
librium point are inconsistent to top decision maker, which may lead to a
deviation from the rational actions in real decision making. In contrast, by
using the DNT based method the derived most likely strategies of Alpha and
Beta are AS5 and BS3, respectively, which are completely consistent with
the equilibrium (AS5, BS3). In this sense, the results obtained by the DNT
based method are more reasonable than that of the TOPSIS based method.
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Table 9: The rankings of Alpha’s strategies for every Beta’s strategy based on different methods
Beta
BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4
DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS
Alpha AS1 1 1 2 2 3 4 2 2
AS2 2 2 1 1 5 5 5 5
AS3 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3
AS4 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 4
AS5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
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Table 10: The rankings of Beta’s strategies for every Alpha’s strategy based on different methods
Alpha
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5
DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS DNT TOPSIS
Beta BS1 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 3
BS2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
BS3 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 1
BS4 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 246
6. Conclusions
Decision making is of catholic concern in many fields. In a traditional
decision making process, there is only an overall goal among decision makers
and the attention is usually given on the selection of optimal one among
multiple decision making alternatives. In this study, our focus is on the issue
of adversarial decision making where the competition not only takes place
in alternatives but also occurs in decision makers. Since there is conflict
of interests among decision makers, the aim of adversarial decision making
is to determine the best alternative for each decision maker against other
adversarial opponents. This paper considers a basic form of adversarial de-
cision making which contains two competitive participants under uncertain
environment. We have proposed a new framework for this type of decision
making problem by utilizing fuzzy set theory, game theory and DNT. The
proposed DNT based game-theoretic framework are made up by four phases
including game analysis, strategy assessment, payoff matrix construction, and
equilibrium calculation. Within the framework, the uncertainty involved in
decision makers’ evaluations is handled by using fuzzy set theory, and DNT,
as a new uncertainty reasoning theory that generalizes Dempster-Shafer the-
ory and has been further improved in the study, is used to integrate these
fuzzy evaluations which are not mutually exclusive, and a two-person non-
constant sum game is constructed to model the conflict of interests between
decision makers from a game theory perspective. An illustrative application
is given to show the effectiveness of the framework. In the future study, the
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adversarial decision making with multiple competitive participants is worthy
to be considered by further extending the proposed framework.
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